The war in Vietnam was heavily influenced by the murder of the sitting president Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother (who was also a chief advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu) on the 2nd of November 1963. Prior to the death of the two brothers, the United States advised the government in South Vietnam on their next moves in their war against the ‘Viet-Cong’ and the government of North Vietnam. American influence was beginning to increase; however, they were not as concerned when assessing the next steps (the war against the North and South would continue) and were not prepared to deploy many more troops than were already stationed and training alongside the South Vietnamese army. However, American policy drastically changed in the wake of the murder of the President Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, which can be seen solely from American participation in the war, as the number of troops involved would eventually reach more than 500,000. Furthermore, the murder of the sitting president in the United States, John F Kennedy, less than three weeks after the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, placed a new head of state in charge of the war policies.
However, what was not clear to the public, was the information given to Kennedy prior to the Coup of Diem, as well as the CIA’s covert role. It is undeniable that the deaths of Diem and Nhu affected the outcome of the war in Vietnam, changing the course taken and speed of which the war escalated.
As mentioned in The Pentagon Papers Volume 2 (pp. 201-276) the United States decided to encourage the overthrow of Diem, as they believed that more rebellious generals offered a greater prospect of winning the war, which was their main priority. Before the assassination of Diem, the United States tried to limit their involvement in Vietnam, in order to enable themselves to be involved in various countries as part of their attempt to limit the spread of communism and the influence of the USSR. However one could argue that in making the conscious decision to allow the coup to take place and tacitly support it, the U.S. inadvertently deepened its involvement in the conflict, therefore changing the course of the war.
Diem’s Government had managed to alienate popular support after its repressive actions against the Buddhists, an intrinsic factor in the fall of the Diem-Nhu regime, therefore favouring the North Vietnamese as the victors in the conflict. However, when the military coup leaders emerged in the political landscape within South Vietnam, they chartered a manageable base of stable political support, and when it came time for the Coup against the Diem-Nhu regime, they were faced with little opposition. This transfer of power was riddled with instability, of which the U.S. assumed significant responsibility for the new regime, therefore evidence of a deepened involvement in the conflict.
The beginning of the political unrest within the Diem-Nhu can be traced back to the regime’s violent suppression of a Buddhist demonstration on May 8th in which nine people were murdered and a further fourteen injured. This led to public outrage and a broadcasting of the Buddhist ‘struggle’ within Vietnam, subsequently sponsoring many protests by the public, performing acts such as defying the ban on flying the Buddhist flag, claiming religious and ethnic repression and discrimination. By the following June, it was clear to the regime that they were not faced with a minority opposition, but rather widespread insecurity and crisis in confidence in their leaders on behalf of the majority of the public. When this factor became clear, they worked with the Buddhists to ease tensions, but no concrete concessions were made by Diem. The outrage on behalf of the Buddhists in Vietnam called for a crisis in American foreign policy.
The U.S. entered the conflict with a policy of unequivocal support for South Vietnam’s struggle against North Vietnam, as well as Diem, which had previously been declared by the US as the only national leader of Vietnam capable of unifying the country in their battle against the spread of communism, but when the public disaffection for Diem persisted with no concessions made on behalf of Diem after repeated U.S. persuasions to repair his public image, the U.S, felt as though they had to change their course. Diem was not focused on his public image, nor was he swayed by numerous threats by the U.S. of their withdrawal of support, and after frankly humiliating attempts to get Diem to attempt an ‘Americanesque’ method of diplomacy, America decided to begin looking at possible outcomes of a military coup. It could be argued that this was the beginning of the crux of every problem involving the United States from 1945 to present day, and that the United States is a self-serving nation. Therefore tacitly condoning a military coup would place the new leader of Vietnam in a submissive position to the United States, open to manipulation and easier to control, in the face of Diem’s defiance. Not only can this be seen in Vietnam, but in over seventy-two covert operations set to meddle in foreign politics since 1945. Therefore, it is clear to see that the U.S. was a catalyst to the assassinations of Diem and Nhu, particularly because of vested personal interest. A quote, directly from the federal archives states ‘Aware of our fundamental commitment to him, Diem could with relative impunity ignore our wishes. It reversed the real power relationship between the two countries. Coupled with Diem's persistent and ruthless elimination of all potential political opposition, it left us with rather stark alternatives indeed when a crisis on which we could not allow delay and equivocation finally occurred.’
The matter seemed to be decided on the part of the Americans as to whether they would carry out the coup when, on the 12th of August, when Nhu ordered attacks resulted in the wounding of about 30 monks, the arrest of over 1,400 Buddhists and the closing of the pagodas, after they had previously been looted by the Army. By the end of August, the U.S. had come into contact with the rebel leaders performing the coup and had set the time in November for the coup to take place. Further, they made the decision to reiterate the NSC on the operation and the McNamara-Taylor report (appraisal of in the war on behalf of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and its American advisers against communism) meaning that all legal documentation showed no evidence of the United States encouraging the coup as it was a war crime. The overthrowing of Diem, without the involvement of the United States, was always a possibility, however their involvement and role as proprietor of the assassinations holds them responsible for the political instability that followed, as well as their loss in the Vietnamese War.
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