Whether or not to classify the Great Irish Famine as a genocide is a complex and controversial question and cannot be answered in so short an essay. Instead, this essay will outline the argument for the crisis qualifying a genocide and in doing so will explore the multiple facets of blame. The Great Famine of 1845 to 1852 was the worst crisis, in terms of mortality, in the 19th century, leading to the death of 1 million people and the emigration of a further 1-2 million. While famine was common in medieval Europe, The Great Famine was distinct in it being caused by an ecological disaster, making its damage permanent. The fungus which caused the famine, Phytophthora infestans, was brought over by North American ships and caused the potato blight through its destruction of the crop. This became serious in 1846, as the fungus caused a second failure which was this time total. Most people died not of direct starvation but of diseases closely linked to malnutrition as well as typhus which spread due to increased migration and worsening levels of hygiene. The blight’s effects were exacerbated by the high dependence on the potato crop and Westminster’s insufficient reaction, justifying the claims of genocide. Around 97% of the Irish population, predominantly rural poor, relied on not only the potato, but on the Irish Lumper variety specifically, making the effects of the fungus disastrous.
The first claim of genocide was made by John Mitchell in The Last Conquest of Ireland in 1861 who believed the British government pursued policies intended to ‘thin out those multitudinous celts’. He compared the 70 million spent on the Crimean war in 1854 and the 20 million plantation owners in the West Indies in 1833 after the abolition of slavery to the relief spent on the Irish which fell under 10 million to make such points. Others who argue the famine should be classified as a genocide, such as James Pius Sweeney, suggest ‘that the British created the conditions of dire hopelessness, and desperate dependence on the potato crop through a series of sadistic, debasing, premeditated and barbarous Penal Laws, which deliberately and systematically stripped the Irish of even the least semblance of basic human freedom.’
The initial prime minister, Robert Peel, chose to import £100,000’s worth of grain from North America in 1848. However, this did more to stabilise food prices than feed the Irish as it was hoarded by the rich and those who did obtain it lacked the necessary machinery to process it, rendering it inedible. More successful were Peel’s Public Reliefs Works which employed around 140,000 people, providing them with wages to buy food. He also, against the wishes of his party and resulting in his downfall, repealed the protectionist tariffs on domestic agriculture known as the ‘Corn Laws’. In these ways, although unsuccessful, the first government demonstrated a considerable attempt at handling the crisis unlike those to follow. However, Peel’s decision to import food rather than stop exports has been criticised as in 1844 there was a net export of grain of 294,000 tons and 485,000 in 1845, suggesting there was sufficient food being produced on the island to save lives.
The following government, as liberal Wigs, approached the crisis with a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude leaving Ireland and the free market to deal with the problem. John Russell’s government decided to leave local merchants to import food, while the government adamantly remained overseeing employment, refusing to extend food schemes despite rising death rates. A combination of economic, religious and racist beliefs was used as justification for inaction with Russell himself describing Ireland as having a ‘cancer of dependency’ while Charles Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, believed the famine to be ‘a visitation from the almighty’. While some public works schemes were initially implemented, after 1847 emergency measures supporting the Irish were removed and the public relief works began failing. Strikingly, soup kitchens were dismantled after six months under the influence of the laissez-faire doctrine despite having fed three million people daily at their peak in July 1847. Work schemes failed as malnutrition prevented labour and inflated prices meant worker’s low wages were insufficient to purchase food for their families. Consequently, in 1849 workhouses were holding 9 times their capacity. In the summer of 1847, the belief amongst the elite that the famine had ended, and the protection of the treasury was to be prioritised further exacerbated the crisis. Simultaneously, charity relief waned as people got tired of the issue, an effect termed ‘famine fatigue’. In addition to failing to provide food, the British government did little to prevent eviction, assist migration to America or welcome the Irish to England. English landlords, some who visited their land in Ireland just once or twice in a lifetime, ruthlessly evicted tenants during the famine with 500,000 evictions recorded in the years 1846 to 1854. The British government did nothing to prevent this or to provide accommodation for the evicted. The resultant migration to Britain was unwelcomed with many of the sick sent back to Ireland by the Unions. Subsequently, many people resorted to migration across the Atlantic to North America. In 1846, 100,000 people emigrated to America and 250,000 in 1847, with under 4% receiving financial assistance from the British government to make the journey. The conditions on-board these ships crossing the Atlantic were so poor that they were termed ‘coffin ships’ as almost 30% of the 100,000 immigrants to Canada in 1847 died on-board or during quarantine, while another 10,000 died on their way to the United States.
The famine came largely to an end in 1852 due to the sheer number of deaths, continued mass emigration and a partial recovery in the crop. Today, Ireland is the only country in Europe with a smaller population than it had in 1840 which this essay has described was largely due to Westminster’s failures. The question that remains is to what extent this was intentional?
By Sophie E
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